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The Economic Loss Rule and Missed
Opportunities: How to Keep Kentucky from
Drowning in a Sea of Tort
Matthew J. Pujol
Suppose a taxi company purchased a fleet of energy efficient taxis in Sep-
tember, and when the weather turned cold, the cars no longer started due
to a defective design. While the taxis were being repaired, the taxi compa-
ny lost thousands of dollars in business. Should the taxi company have the
ability to sue the distributor who sold the defective vehicles? Should the
taxi company be able to sue the manufacturer for economic losses caused
by the defective design of the taxis?
Traditionally, the economic loss rule' would bar recovery in tort for eco-
nomic losses, such as lost profits, forcing the taxi company to rely on its
contractual remedies. A judicially created doctrine, the economic loss rule
prevents plaintiffs from recovering under tort law when the plaintiff only
suffered economic damages, such as lost profits and the cost of repairs.
3
The economic loss rule, however, does not bar damages for personal inju-
ries, which are still recoverable under tort law.4 Courts use the economic
loss rule to bar lawsuits that seek to redress monetary losses through claims
of negligence.' Instead, the rule forces plaintiffs to rely on their contractual
remedies, such as breach of warranty.6 Courts justify the rule as a means
of separating tort and contract law, which forces the parties to allocate risks
in the contract and to rely on contractual remedies.7 Across the nation, the
economic loss rule has developed into a powerful tool for preventing negli-
gence claims in cases in which the plaintiff suffers no physical injury.8
I J.D. expected zoo8, University of Kentucky College of Law; M.A., History, University
of Kentucky, 2002; B.A., History, Thomas More College, 2000.
2 Commentators have also referred to it as the economic loss doctrine. Since this Note
focuses on Justice Keller's concurring opinion in Presnell Construction Managers, Inc. v. EH
Construction, LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Ky. 2004) (Keller, J. and Graves, J., concurring), it will
use the terminology Justice Keller employed.
3 See, e.g., R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MaY L. REV. 1789, 1794-96
(2000).
4 See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., S73 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Wis. 1998).
5 See Barton, supra note 3, at 1793-96.
6 See Cedarapids, 573 N.W.zd at 846.
7 Id. at 845-46.
8 In other words, the economic loss rule is "[tlhe principle that a plaintiff cannot sue
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"I believe [the Kentucky Supreme] Court should expressly adopt the
economic loss rule in order to encourage contracting parties to allocate...
[their] risks" in a contract. 9 With this statement from the opening lines of
his concurring opinion in Presnell Constonstruction Managers, Inc. v. EH Con-
struction, LLC, Kentucky Supreme Court Justice Keller openly endorsed
the economic loss rule for the first time in a Kentucky state court.'0 Un-
fortunately, the majority did not follow Justice Keller's lead and, as a re-
sult, federal courts sitting in Kentucky have since questioned the extent
to which the economic loss rule should apply within the state. 1 This Note
will show that the adoption of the economic loss rule by the Kentucky Su-
preme Court would benefit the commonwealth because it would not only
protect the sanctity of contracts by keeping them separate from torts but
also would provide guidance to federal courts sitting in Kentucky when
determining Kentucky state-law issues.
Over the past forty years, the economic loss rule has become a promi-
nent part of litigation across the nation, as indicated by its presence in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.' The rule initially faced op-
position from the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1965, when it allowed
recovery for economic loss when only the product itself was damaged. 3
Nevertheless, California developed the reasoning behind the economic
loss rule that same year. 4 Although those courts initiated the debate over
the economic loss rule, the United States Supreme Court later endorsed it
in the maritime case of East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval.'5 Most
jurisdictions have followed the lead of the Supreme Court by adopting the
rule, 16 and Kentucky state courts have applied the principles behind the
rule 7 without expressly adopting it.
in tort to recover for purely monetary loss-as opposed to physical injury or property dam-
age-caused by the defendant." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (8th ed. 2004).
9 Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Ky. 2004)
(Keller, J. and Graves, J., concurring).
1o Federal District Courts in Kentucky had discussed the adoption of the economic loss
rule prior to Presnell. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
i i See infra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998). See generally Christopher
Scott D'Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law From Drowning in a
Sea of Tort, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591 (1995) (discussing the impact of the economic loss through-
out the nation).
13 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 207 A.zd 305, 307 (N.J. 1965).
14 Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.zd 145,15 1. (Cal. 1965)
15 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). Although tort
issues generally arise under state law, the United States Supreme Court deals with economic
loss in admiralty cases, where federal courts have jurisdiction.
16 Casa Clara Condo. Assoc., Inc., v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,1246
n.z (Fla. 1993).
17 Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Ky. 2004)
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After flirting with the economic loss rule for a couple of decades, the
Kentucky Supreme Court had the opportunity to delineate its position on
the subject in Presnell Construction Managers, Inc. v. EH Construction, LLC.18
However, only Justice Keller's concurring opinion suggested that the court
adopt the rule.' 9 This failure of the Kentucky high court to adopt the eco-
nomic loss rule has placed Kentucky's federal district courts in a quandary.
When the federal courts apply Kentucky state law to the tort claims, they
have little guidance on applying the economic loss rule, especially when
it could extend to areas outside of products liability." Kentucky should
adopt the economic loss rule to resolve this ambiguity, as well as to keep
contracts separate from torts.
Courts have supported adoption of the economic loss rule for various
reasons, but the primary motivation remains separating contract law from
tort law."' Courts have observed that when purely economic losses occur,
the parties had the ability to allocate such losses through a contract.2 " Nev-
ertheless, the economic loss rule has proven difficult to apply in a uniform
fashion because questions arise concerning the extent to which the rule
applies to areas outside products liability.2 3 Exceptions to the rule, such as
negligent misrepresentation, have also made consistent application of the
rule more difficult.2 4 Such exceptions permit lawsuits for tort claims tradi-
(Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring) ("Kentucky appellate courts have implicitly applied [the
economic loss rule] in the past.").
18 Presness Constr. Managers v. EH Constr., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575.
19 Id. at 583 (Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring).
20 See infra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
21 See Casa Clara Condo. Assoc., Inc., v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,
1246 n.2 (Fla. 1993) ("The economic loss rule has been adopted in a majority of jurisdic-
tions."); Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.zd 842, 846 (Wis. 1998). For
cases that show the national acceptance of the rule, see also Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604. 10 (West
1994); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pacific Res., Inc., 835 E Supp. 1195, 1 I99 (D. Haw. 1993); Airport
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1203, 1205-o6 (S.D. Fla.1992) (Florida has
adopted the economic loss rule but permits recovery in tort for economic losses under the "no
alternate remedy exception," meaning that recovery is permissible "when there is no contract
under which the party may recover for the loss of the product."); ERA Helicopters, Inc. v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 696 F. Supp. IO96, 1097-98 (E.D. La. 1987); Wellcraft Marine v.
Zarzour, 577 So.2d 414,418 (Ala. 199o); Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1198
(Del.1992); Nelson v. Todd's Ltd., 426 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Iowa 1988); FMR Corp. v. Boston
Edison Co., 613 N.E.zd 902, 903 (Mass. 1993); Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass'n
v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267, 270 (Me.1995); Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div.-
Pennwalt Corp., 514 N.E.zd 1299, 1304 (Ind. App. Ct. 1987); Elite Prof'ls, Inc. v. Carrier Corp.,
827 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). This list is by no means exhaustive. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d (1998)
22 Cedarapids, 573 N.W.zd at 846; see also Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d
236, 240 (6th Cir. 1994).
23 See Davis v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 785, 8oi (W.D. Ky.
2005).
24 See generally Stewart I. Edelstein, Beware the Economic Loss Rule: It Limits Recovery
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tionally barred by the economic loss rule."5 Despite these drawbacks, the
rule still provides a good incentive for the parties to allocate risks within
the contract.16 With the risks assigned in the contracts, parties can better
predict future costs for liability, which allows them to minimize costs.2 7
The economic loss rule can benefit Kentucky by preventing tort recov-
ery when the parties should have allocated their risks in a contract. While
Kentucky state courts have used the ideas behind this rule in the past, the
Kentucky Supreme Court should officially adopt it and apply it to areas
outside of products liability. Further, acceptance of the economic loss rule
at the state court level would also provide the federal courts sitting in Ken-
tucky with clear guidelines on when and how to apply it.
In Part I, this Note will provide a brief history of the economic loss
rule, examining its development at the national level and within Kentucky.
Part II will examine Presnell Construction Managers, Inc. v. EH Construction,
LLC, 8 in which Justice Keller recommended the adoption of the rule, 
2 9
to show how this case has affected the application of the rule within the
commonwealth. Next, Part III will highlight how other jurisdictions have
applied the rule and discuss policy reasons for and against the economic
loss rule, including some important exceptions. Although courts have ap-
plied the economic loss rule across a wide spectrum of legal fields, this
Note focuses primarily on its application in the commercial context, where
contractual remedies can easily apply.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ECONOMic Loss RULE
The rapid acceptance of the economic loss rule over the past thirty years
illustrates its importance to American jurisprudence. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court expressed the ideas behind the economic loss rule in the
1920s, 30 other courts did not formally adopt the doctrine for nearly half
a century.31 New Jersey's initial step in denying the economic loss rule
quickly became the minority position., 3 with California leading the way in
developing the rule.3 3 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the eco-
for Commercial Economic Loss on Tort Theory, but Exceptions Provide Relief from Draconian
Consequences, 42-JUN JTLATRIAL 42 (2oo6).
25 See id.
26 See infra notes I72-77 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 178-82.
28 Presnell Constr. Managers v. EH Constr., LLC, 134 S.W3d 575 (Ky. 2004).
29 Id. at 583 (Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring).
30 See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303,307 (1927).
31 See Seely v. White Motor Co. 403 P.2d 145, 147-52 (Cal. 1965).
32 See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,869 (1986); Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, 207 A.2d 305,309 (N.J. 1965).
33 See Seely, 403 P.zd at I5O-5 .
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nomic loss rule in 19 8 6 .' Although Kentucky has not adopted the rule,
the state appellate courts have implied it in a number of decisions over the
years, leading to Justice Keller's concurrence in Presnell.35
A. Development of the Economic Loss Rule in the United States
In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court became the first court to espouse the ideas
behind the economic loss rule,36 addressing the issue in Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Flint,3 a maritime case in which the plaintiffs sought purely
economic damages.38 The defendant had negligently caused damage to
the ship's propeller while the ship was docked, forcing the vessel to remain
docked for repairs for two additional weeks. The plaintiffs sought recovery
for the lost use of their ship while it underwent repairs.39 While ultimately
ruling for the defendant based on a lack of privity,4 the Court did lay the
groundwork for the eventual use of the economic loss rule.4 Writing for
the majority, Justice Holmes noted that "[tihe damage was material to [the
plaintiff] only as it caused the delay in making repairs, and that delay would
be wrong to no one except for the [defendant's] contract with the own-
ers."4 This language seems to indicate that, short of physical harm to the
plaintiffs, the Court would refuse any recovery for purely economic dam-
ages, such as lost profits. While not expressly adopting the economic loss
rule, Justice Holmes did propose the notion that tort law could not provide
a remedy when only economic losses occur.4 3
The next major case regarding the economic loss rule came from the
New Jersey Supreme Court, when the court allowed recovery for economic
damages caused by a defective product in Santorv. A & M Karagheusian.
44
The plaintiff purchased carpet from a retailer, and soon after its installation,
the plaintiff noticed and complained to the retailer about a defect in the
carpet. The plaintiff then contacted the manufacturer, confirmed that he
34 See E. River, 476 U.S. at 87 1-72.
35 See Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Ky. 2004)
(Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 307.
37 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. Flint, 275 U.S. 303.
38 While the Court properly refers to the parties as petitioner and respondent, this Note
will refer to them as defendant and plaintiff respectively for an easier identification of the
tortfeasor.
39 Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 307.
40 Id. at 307-08. The plaintiffs contracted the use of their ship to a third party, who had
then employed the defendant's dock. Since the plaintiffs did not contract directly with the
dock, the Court barred them from seeking damages.
41 Id. at 3o8-o9.
42 Id. at 308.
43 Id.
44 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 207 A.zd 305 (N.J. 1965).
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had received the correct grade of carpet, and obtained an assurance that the
manufacturer would correct the problem. When the manufacturer failed
to remedy the problem, the plaintiff filed suit claiming a breach of implied
warranty of merchantability and a defective design in the carpet.4"
Santor presented the New Jersey Supreme Court with the prerequisites
for applying the economic loss rule: a defective product caused damage
only to itself, and the injury resulted in only economic losses.46 Typically,
these facts would bar judgment for the plaintiff when applying the eco-
nomic loss rule.47 Nonetheless, the Santor court rejected the plaintiff's
claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, reasoning that
economic damages alone did not create an implied warranty.48 Instead, the
court allowed recovery under the tort claims.49 In trying to avoid judicial
waste, 0 the court opened the door for claims in which the only damage oc-
curred to the product itself.
In the same year, California adopted the economic loss rule in Seely v.
White Motor Company, stating that manufacturers are prevented from fac-
ing "liab[ility] for damages of unknown and unlimited scope.""1 In Seely,
the plaintiff experienced trouble with a truck that he had purchased for
business purposes and made several attempts with the retailer to repair
the problem. Eventually, the brakes failed, causing the truck to flip over.
While the plaintiff incurred no physical injuries, his truck was severely
damaged, and he refused to make any further payments on the vehicle.
5
1
The plaintiff brought suit against the retailer and the manufacturer for the
repair costs, for the amount paid on the purchase price, and for the profits
he lost because he was unable to use his truck for its intended purpose.
3
After the plaintiff dropped the retailer from the suit, the trial court found
the manufacturer liable for the amount the plaintiff had already paid and
for the lost profits.-
Although the California Supreme Court agreed that the manufacturer
had breached an express warranty,5 the court also concluded that a tort
45 Id. at 307.
46 Id.
47 See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870-71 (1986).
48 Santor, 207 A.zd at 309 (The court "[saw] no just cause for recognition of the existence
of an implied warranty of merchantability and a right to recovery for breach thereof... simply
because loss of value of the article sold is the only damage resulting from the breach.").
49 Id.
50 Id. at 31o.
51 Seely v. White Motor Co. 403 P.2d 145, 15o-51 (Cal. 1965).
52 Id. at 147.
53 Id. at 147-48.
54 The trial court did not award damages for repairs due to the accident because the
plaintiff could not prove that the "galloping" of the vehicle caused the accident. Id. at 148.
55 Id. at 150 (stating that the defendant "is responsible for these losses only because it
warranted the truck to be 'free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use
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claim for lost profits could not stand because "[t]he manufacturer would be
liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope."5 6 The court noted
that the policy supporting this decision was that "[t]he distinction that the
law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty re-
covery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of
one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury."57 Instead, the
court suggested that "[e]ven in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's li-
ability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery
for economic loss alone."5" The U.S. Supreme Court would weigh in on the
issue twenty years later
The U.S. Supreme Court firmly established Seely as the majority posi-
tion when it adopted the economic loss rule in East River Steamship Corp. v.
TransamericaDelaval, Inc.5 9 a maritime products liability case. In EastRiver,
a defective part caused engine failure in four different ships. 6° The plain-
tiffs sued not only for the cost of repairs but also for profits lost while the
ships were out of service. 61 The Supreme Court explained that products
liability had grown out of a need to protect individuals when their injuries
exceeded bargained-for contractual remedies. 6 Nevertheless, if the Court
extended this protection too far, then "contract law would drown in a sea
of tort."'  With this, the Court disallowed tort claims for products liability
when no personal injury occurred out of the fear that tort law would reign
supreme. This, in the Court's view, would place a burden on manufactur-
ers who had no reason to expect such liability.6 The Court stated, "When
a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak
and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong. '6s
These contractual remedies allow the parties to insure their products and
not risk unexpected liability down the road.' After East River, the promi-
and service"').
56 Id. at 150-51. The court added that the "[alpplication of the rules of warranty prevents
this result." Id. at 151. The court concluded that the truck was unsuitable for Seely's use,
since it performed suitably under its next owner. Based on this premise, the court ruled that
permitting tort claims where the product did not meet the expectations of the buyer would
open a manufacturer to hu,e liabilities that it could not prevent since the buyer would only
deal with a retailer and t - manufacturer could not disclaim the proper liability. Id. at 150.
57 Id. at 151.
58 Id.
59 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 86o-6i (1986).
6o Id.
61 Id. at 861.
6z Id. at 866 ("Products liability grew out of a public policy judgment that people need
more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by the law of warranty.").
63 Id.
64 Id. at 871.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 871-72.
2006-2007]
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nence of the economic loss rule grew as state and federal courts adopted
the Supreme Court's reasoning to justify the application of the rule in their
jurisdictions.
B. Development of the Economic Loss Rule in Kentucky
Before examining Presnell,6' this Note will summarize a few important Ken-
tucky state court decisions involving economic loss issues' which show
the willingness of Kentucky state courts to apply the economic loss rule
in principle, without addressing the issue outright.69 Then this Note will
address Bowling Green Municipal Utilities v. Thomasson Lumber Co.,'0 a federal
district court case from the Western District of Kentucky in which the court
decided that Kentucky state courts would likely accept the economic loss
rule and accordingly applied the rule to the case at hand.7 These cases set
the stage for Presnell, a Kentucky Supreme Court case in which the ma-
jority opinion avoided the economic loss rule altogether and adopted the
negligent misrepsentation exception to the rule instead.7"
Since Kentucky has not specifically addressed the economic loss rule,
the cases that involved economic loss issues have led to confusing, if not
contradictory, results. In 1956, Kentucky's high court adopted the Restate-
ment (First) of Torts § 395, which addressed the negligent manufacture of
chattels. 3 The court found that this section covered damages when a
product injured itself and other property,14 contrary to the economic loss
rule, which forbids recovery of damages for the defective product. When
67 Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2004).
68 See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text. For a more in-depth discussion of
Kentucky's history with the economic loss rule, see Thomas R. Yocum & Charles E Hollis,
III, The Economic Loss Rule in Kentucky: Will Contract Law Drown in a Sea of Tort?, 28 N. Ky. L.
REV. 456 (2001).
69 See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
70 Bowling Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber Co., 902 E Supp. 134 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
71 See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
72 See Presnell, 134 S.W.3 d at 5 82.
73 C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.zd 534, 537 (Ky. 1956).
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manu-
facture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize
as involving an unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm to
those who lawfully use it for a purpose for which it is manufactured and
to those whom the supplier should expect to be in the vicinity of its
probable use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them by its
lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is manufactured.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 395 (1934)).
74 C.D. Herme, 294 S.W.2d at 537. A defective trailer pin snapped causing damage to the
trailer itself. Id. at 535.
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Kentucky adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in 1965," retail-
ers who sell products that cause physical injury to either a consumer or
his property became subject to liability.7 6 Unfortunately, the court did not
elaborate on the meaning of "property" when adopting section 395, allow-
ing later courts to interpret whether it should apply to the defective good
itself."
In 1990, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reexamined this issue in Falcon
Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co.,78 establishing that section 402A "impos[es]
liability for physical harm ... to the user or his other property, but not
for harm caused only to the product itself."79 The court even cited to the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in East River as the reason for adopting this
policy.80 In 1994, the court addressed an issue similar that in Presnelpl3 in
Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, in which a homeowner sued the builder
for negligent construction." The court "recognize[d] that tort recovery is
contingent upon damage from a destructive occurrence as contrasted with
economic loss related solely to diminution in value ...." Although neither
decision addressed the economic loss rule, the Court of Appeals clearly ap-
plied the principles behind the rule in both. 4
In 1995, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Ken-
tucky examined Kentucky's use of the economic loss rule and, despite a
lack of guidance from the state courts, decided to implement the rule.85 In
Bowling Green Municipal Utilities v. Thomasson Lumber Co., manufacturers of
wooden utility poles failed to seal them properly, forcing the plaintiff to
replace them.86 When the plaintiff sued under negligence and contracts
claims, the defendants moved to bar the tort claims under the economic
loss rule. 7 The district court, "[bleing reluctant to predict whether Ken-
tucky courts would apply the economic loss rule[,] ... certified the ques-
tion to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which declined to hear the mat-
75 Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co. 402 S.W.2d 44I, 446 (Ky. 1965).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 402A (1965).
77 See Yocum & Hollis, supra note 68, at 461.
78 Falcon Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 199o).
79 Id.
8o Id. at 948-49 .
81 Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, (Ky. 2004).
82 Real Estate Mktg. Inc. v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921,923 (Ky. 1994).
83 Id. at 926.
84 Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 587 (Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring) (In Real Estate Marketing
and Falcon Coal, "the Court of Appeals adopted, albeit sub silentio, the economic-loss-rule
principle that bars recovery for economic loss based upon strict liability in tort.").
85 Bowling Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber Co., 902 F Supp. 134, 136-38 (W.D.
Ky. 1995).
86 Id. at 136.
87 Id. at 135.
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ter."88 The District Court considered the various arguments for adopting
the rule, such as requiring parties to allocate liability in their contracts and
keeping contract law separate from tort law. 89 The court then fought its
way through Kentucky's history of economic loss decisions, 90 and decided
"that Kentucky would not allow recovery in tort under either theories of
negligence or strict liability where the subject damage is limited to the
product itself."9' Unfortunately, because this opinion came from a federal
court, it is not binding on Kentucky state courts. Nevertheless, it illustrates
Kentucky's need to adopt the economic loss rule in order to end the confu-
sion at both federal and state levels. Without this guidance, defendants in
federal court could continue to face liability for cases involving economic
loss. 92
II. PREsNELL CONSTRUCTION: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
TO ADOPT THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE
In Presnell Construction Managers, Inc. v. EH Construction, LLC, 93 the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court was presented with the perfect opportunity to adopt
the economic loss rule, since it only involved economic losses' and the
plaintiff had signed a contract disallowing any damages for economic loss. 9
Instead, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted negligent misrepresenta-
tion as an exception to the economic loss rule,% presenting the plaintiff with
an opportunity to recover97 though the contract would not have allowed it.9"
Justice Keller's concurring opinion, in which Justice Graves joined, recom-
mended adoption of the economic loss rule, which would have barred the
plaintiff's claim. 99 In the wake of Presnell, Kentucky federal district courts
have been hesitant to apply the rule, especially when it would extend to
areas beyond products liability."° This emphasizes the fact that Kentucky
needs to adopt and apply the economic loss rule to areas outside products
88 Id.
89 Id. at 136-37.
9o Id. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
9! Bowling Grren, 902 F. Supp. at 138 (noting that the Sixth Circuit had predicted the
same inMillr'sBottedGas v. Boig-Warnfe Corp., 955 Fzd 1043, 1049-50 (6th Cir. 1992)).
92 The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in East Rivetr only applies in admiralty cases.
93 Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575,588 (Ky. 2004).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 577-
96 Id. at 582.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 577.
99 Id. at 583 (Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring).
ioo See Pioneer Res. Corp. v. Nami Res. Corp., LLC, No. 6:o4-465-DCR, 2oo6 WL
1778318, at * 7 (E.D. Ky. June 26, 2006).
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liability. Adoption of the economic loss rule would end the reluctance of
federal courts in applying the rule and force parties in Kentucky to allocate
their risks in the contract.
A. The Presnell Majority Opinion's Avoidance of the Economic Loss Rule
Presnell offered a perfect opportunity for Kentucky's Supreme Court to
adopt the economic loss rule since EH Construction sought to recover eco-
nomic damages due to losses from Presnell's negligent supervision of the
work site."01 In Presnell, a building owner (DeLor) entered into contracts
with a construction manager (Presnell Construction) 02 and with a corpora-
tion (EH Construction) that provided labor for the building's renovation. 3
EH sued Presnell for negligent misrepresentation and negligent supervi-
sion, 1°4 claiming Presnell's lack of supervision had forced EH to redo some
of the construction and thus lose profits. 0 Because Presnell and DeLor
had signed a contract disclaiming any liability from third parties," the trial
court found that EH had no basis for a negligence claim against Presnell
due to a lack of privity.' 07 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, adopt-
ed Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552,108 which describes negligent misrep-
resentation,0 9 giving Presnell an independent duty to supervise the project
io For a more detailed discussion of the construction implications of Presnell, see gener-
ally, Steven M. Henderson, Walking the Line between Contract and Tort in Construction Disputes:
Assessing the Use of Negligent Misrepresentation to Recover Economic Loss after Presnell, 95 Ky. L.J.
145 (2007).
102 For an explanation of the construction terms, see id. at 145-46, nn. 4-6.
103 Presnell, I34 S.W.3d at 577.
io4 Id. at 576. For more details regarding the construction aspects see Henderson, supra
note 104, at 145-48.
105 Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 578.
io6 Id. at 577 The contract read, "Nothing contained in this Agreement shall create a
contractual relationship with or a cause of action in favor of a third party against either the
Owner or the Construction Manager." EH had also signed a similar agreement with DeLor
limiting the liability of third party construction managers. Id.
107 Id. at 578.
io8 Id.
1o9 Section 552, titled Information Negligently Supplied For The Guidance Of Others,
provides:
(i) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise rea-
sonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the informa-
tion.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
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with reasonable care."' Presnell then appealed to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, " ' giving the court an opportunity to accept the economic loss rule.
In taking the case, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court focused on
negligent misrepresentation, because if Presnell owed no contractual du-
ties to EH, it would leave EH without a remedy unless one existed under
tort law. The court decided that "an independent duty" needed to exist in
order for EH to bring a negligence claim against Presnell. The court rea-
soned that EH, as an incidental beneficiary to the contract between DeLor
and Presnell, could not claim that Presnell owed it any contractual duties."1
Since EH did not have a contractual relationship with Presnell, the court
ruled that Presnell had no contractual duty to EH and therefore EH could
not bring a claim." 3
Having rejected EH's contractual claims, the Kentucky Supreme Court
sought to create an independent duty for Presnell, and found such a duty
in negligent misrepresentation." 4 In examining Kentucky's history with
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, the court held that "negligent misrep-
resentation is actionable in Kentucky.""' 5 The court stated that "the tort
of negligent misrepresentation defines an independent duty for which re-
covery in tort for economic loss is available."' 16 Since EH had no contrac-
tual obligations with Presnell, and EH only sought economic damages, the
court used negligent misrepresentation to avoid an unfortunate outcome
for EH and established a significant exception to the economic loss rule.
Subsection (i) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that
the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the in-
formation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a
substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the infor-
mation extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose
benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is in-
tended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
i Io Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 578.
iii Id.
112 Id. at 579-8o (The court stated that "unless Presnell breached some duty to EH
apart from its duties to DeLor under the contract-i.e an independent duty-EH, who was,
at the most, an incidental beneficiary of the contract between DeLor and Presnell, cannot
maintain an action in negligence against Presnell.").
113 Id. at 579.
114 Id. at 582.
115 Id. at 58o-8I (Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring).
i16 Id. at 582.
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B. Presnell's Concurring Opinion Favoring
the Adoption of the Economic Loss Rule
While Justices Keller and Graves concurred with the majority's outcome,
they also sought to instill the economic loss rule into Kentucky jurispru-
dence.11' Justice Keller agreed with the majority's conclusion that EH did
not have a negligence claim against Presnell and argued that the economic
loss rule barred EH's claims as well." 's Justice Keller then explored the his-
tory of economic loss across the nation and within Kentucky itself. 119 He
concluded, "while neither [the Kentucky Supreme] Court nor the Court of
Appeals has expressly articulated or relied upon the economic loss rule in
a published opinion, both courts have applied the rule's principles without
identifying their source."' 10 Justice Keller then recommended that Ken-
tucky adopt the economic loss rule because it would protect manufacturers
and contractors from the unlimited and unpredictable liability found in tort
law.'"' In the end, however, Justice Keller only applied the rule to EH's
claims for negligence,' accepting the majority's adoption of section 552 al-
lowing the claim for negligent supervision as an exception to the economic
loss rule."2 3
1'7 Id. at 583.
118
... EH's common law negligence claim against Presnell for neg-
ligent supervision of the project is barred not only by the rule that the
majority applies, i.e., "one who is not a party to the contract or in privity
thereto may not maintain an action for negligence which consists merely
in the breach of the contract," but also by the economic loss rule, which
Kentucky appellate courts have implicitly applied in the past.
Id.
i19 Id. at 583-90. Justice Keller paid particular attention to the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in Town of Alma v. Azco Construction, Inc., IO P.3d 1256 (Colo. 2000), stating,
"I find the Colorado Supreme Court's articulation of the economic loss rule to be consistent
with prior decisions of the Kentucky appellate courts, and I would therefore adopt it as the
economic loss rule in this jurisdiction." Id. at 590. In Alma, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the economic loss rule does not apply when a duty existed independent of the contract.
Alma, 1o P.3d at 1263. This is very similar to the reasoning behind the majority's decision in
Prsnell, which created an independent duty through the adoption of negligent misrepresenta-
tion. Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 582 (majority opinion). See Henderson, supra note ioi, at 164-67.
120 Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 586 (Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring); see supra notes 76--84
and accompanying text.
121 Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 584 (Keller, J. & Graves, J., concurring).




C. Federal Court in Kentucky Decisions Post-Presnell
Following Presnell, the federal district courts in Kentucky have reexamined
the status of the economic loss rule in Kentucky, leading to a general reluc-
tance to apply the rule to fields outside of products liability.14 In Louisville
Gas &Electric Co. v. Continental Field Systems,' an electric company sought
to recover damages from the replacement of a broken fan shaft and the re-
sulting loss of revenue. I"6 The defendants, subcontractors who were hired
to provide maintenance services, asserted the economic loss rule, claiming
that they had only provided repair services to the plaintiff."7 While not-
ing that the Western District had accepted economic loss in Bowling Green
Municipal Utilities v. Thomasson Lumber Co.,' the court also acknowledged
that "[niothing in the state case law since has clarified the likely tendency
of Kentucky courts" to accept or reject the economic loss rule."2 9 Since the
Kentucky Supreme Court did not adopt the economic loss rule in Presnell,
the district court could only rely on Bowling Green.30
Since Louisville Gas &Electric involved a "provision of services,"'' some-
thing new to Kentucky's economic loss jurisprudence and not the typical
"selling of a product," 32 the federal court had to break new ground with-
out guidance from the Kentucky Supreme Court. The defendants argued
that Presnell encouraged courts to expand the economic loss rule beyond
its traditional role, which does not include service contracts. 3 3 Although
the court agreed that Kentucky courts would apply the economic loss rule
in its traditional capacity,134 "it would be pure speculation to suggest that
Kentucky courts would adopt the broader application of the rule discussed
in the Presnell concurrence." 3 '
A few months later, the same district court declined to apply the eco-
nomic loss rule to an employment contract, opening the door for more tort
claims. In Davis v. Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc.,'1 36 a former Siemens
124 See infra notes 125-52 and accompanying text.
125 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cont'l Field Sys., 420 F. Supp. 2d 764 (W.D. Ky. 2005).
126 Id. at 765.
127 Id. at 768.
128 Bowling Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber Co., 902 F Supp. 134 (W.D. Ky.
1995).
129 Louisville Gas &Elec., 42o E Supp. at 769.
130 See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
I31 Louisville Gas &Elec., 420 F. Supp. at 769.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 770 (The Western District found "that it is on sound ground in predicting that
Kentucky courts would apply the economic loss rule in its classic definition.").
135 Id.
136 Davis v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 399 E Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Ky. zoo5).
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employee sued for the additional compensation his employer had prom-
ised.'37 The defendant argued that the court should apply the economic
loss rule to dismiss the claims of misrepresentation and that the plaintiff
should rely on his contractual remedy.'38 The court countered, stating that
"to date, no Kentucky court has held that the economic loss rule applies
so expansively. Instead the economic loss rule has been limited to ap-
ply to products liability cases and to construction cases."' 39 The court then
concluded that "expand[ing] the rule so as to bar a fraudulent inducement
claim in an employment contract without further guidance from the Ken-
tucky courts would eviscerate the claim of fraudulent inducement and
would contravene contrary Kentucky case law."'" As in Bowling Green, 4'
the Western District expressed a reluctance to extend the economic loss
rule beyond products liability,4 ' keeping the door open for tort claims of
fraud and misrepresentation.
Following the leads of Louisville Gas & Electric and Siemens, the East-
ern District of Kentucky has also limited the application of the economic
loss rule to products liability claims. In Pioneer Resources Corp. v. Nami Re-
sources Co., LLC,143 the plaintiff entered into contracts for purchase of four
gas wells from a natural gas company.' 44 The plaintiff alleged fraud and
underpayment in both the operation and the construction of these wells, 4 '
but the defendants asserted that the economic loss rule barred fraudulent
underpayment claims because of a lack of privity.' 4 Similar to the Western
District,'47 the Eastern District recognized that Kentucky state courts had
accepted the ideas behind the economic loss rule but that no state court
had officially adopted the rule in claims other than those based on products
liability.'" The court then concluded that the Kentucky appellate courts
typically applied the rule to products liability, 49 accordingly declined to
137 Id. at 789-90.
138 Id. at 8oi ("Siemens argues that because Davis's misrepresentation claim is insepa-
rable from his contractual claims, Davis's exclusive remedy is breach of contract.").
139 Id. (citations omitted).
140 Id.
141 Bowling Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber, 902 F. Supp. 134, 138 (W.D. Ky.
1995).
142 Davis, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 8oi.
143 Pioneer Res. Corp. v. Nami Res. Co., LLC, No. 6:04-465-DCR, zoo6 WL 1778318
(E.D. Ky. June 26, 2006).
144 Id. at *1.
145 ld. at *a.
'46 Id. at *6.
147 See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
148 Pioneer, 2oo6 WL 1778318, at *6 (More specifically, the Eastern District Court noted
that although "the Supreme Court of Kentucky has never expressly adopted the economic




expand the reach of the economic loss rule.5 0 Furthermore, the Eastern
District found "that the Kentucky Supreme Court would likely not extend
the economic loss doctrine outside the products liability, business purchas-
es or construction cases."'' Once more, a federal district court sitting in
Kentucky failed to apply the economic loss rule because the Kentucky
Supreme Court has not provided guidance.'
Presnell presented a great opportunity for the Kentucky Supreme Court
to adopt the economic loss rule and establish its boundaries within the
commonwealth. Unfortunately, the majority failed to do this and instead
adopted an exception to the rule in the form of negligent misrepresenta-
tion.5 3 Despite Justice Keller's strong argument for Kentucky's adopting
the economic loss rule,"s recent federal court decisions have shown that
his concurring opinion had little effect on achieving this end.'55 Accord-
ingly, parties in service contracts still face tort liability when their services
do not meet the other party's expectations. Instead, parties should address
this issue through their contracts and allocate their risks accordingly. Such
reasoning forms the basis for the economic loss rule.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING ADOPTION
OF THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE
Three important policy considerations support adoption of the economic
loss rule. Most importantly, the rule distinguishes between tort and con-
tract, allowing parties to allocate their risks through a contract and encour-
age them to insure against these risks.'5 6 In addition, the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability includes a section that addresses the economic
loss rule,' 5' showing the acceptance the rule has gained in American ju-
risprudence. Despite the reasons for adopting the rule, negligent misrep-
resentation and fraud have become powerful exceptions to the economic
loss rule.'58 Finally, an intermediate approach to the economic loss rule also
150 Id. at *7 ("This Court, however, cannot conclude that the concurring opinion from
Prrsnell is persuasive evidence that the Kentucky Supreme Court will expand the applicabil-
ity of the economic loss rule to all types of cases.").
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Ky.
2004)
154 Id. at 583-91.
155 See supra notes 125-52 and accompanying text.
156 Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. 1998).
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998).
158 See, e.g., Edelstein, supra note 24.
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exists, which allows recovery for the defective product itself if the product
had the potential to cause physical harm." 9
A. Reasons for Adopting the Economic Loss Rule in Kentucky
While the economic loss rule has been adopted in a majority of jurisdic-
tions, 160 the reasons for its acceptance have varied.'6 Different rationales
for supporting the economic loss rule have arisen because the rule itself
"is stated with ease but applied with great difficulty,"'16 as courts continue
to debate the parameters of the rule. 163 The questions involved generally
revolve around whether the rule should apply to the defective product it-
self,164 or whether economic loss should be restricted to the field of products
liability.165 Nonetheless, courts have found significant value in applying it
to avoid crossing the line that separates contract and tort law.'66 Otherwise,
bargained-for contractual damages would be displaced, as any aggrieved
party could sue under tort, regardless of any contractual limitations.
67
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin articulated three reasons why contract
law presents a more suitable remedy for cases involving purely economic
damages.' 6 The first follows the traditional argument that the economic
159 Several variations of the intermediary positions have developed over the years.
Although the Supreme Court did not adopt any of these positions in East Riverv. Transametria,
the Court did provide a brief summary of the seminal cases involved. E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1986).
i6o D'Angelo, supra note 12, at 607.
16I For a broad overview of the economic loss rule and the reasons behind it, see gener-
ally Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure Economic
Loss, 48 Antz, L. REv. 773 (zoo6); Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss
Claims, 48 ARlz. L. REv. 713 (2oo6).
16z Sandarac Ass'n, Inc. v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, k35z (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Stone's Throw Condo. Ass'n v. Sand Cove Apts.,
Inc., 749 So. zd 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
163 See E. River, 476 U.S. at 868-70.
164 Seeid. at 871-75.
I65 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
167 See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.zd 842, 846 (Wis. 1998).
168
Application of the economic loss doctrine to tort actions between
commercial parties is generally based on three policies, none of which is
affected by the presence or absence of privity between the parties: (i) to
maintain the fundamental distinction between tort law and contract law;
(2) to protect commercial parties' freedom to allocate economic risk by
contract; and (3) to encourage the parry best situated to assess the risk




loss rule preserves the line that courts have drawn between contract and
tort law. The court reasoned that "[a]t the heart of the distinction drawn by
the economic loss doctrine is the concept of duty."'69 The court explained
that "[clontract law rests on obligations imposed by bargain" whereas "[tihe
law of torts ... rests on obligations imposed by law." 70 Thus, where contract
law seeks to enforce promises, tort law looks to protect individuals and so-
ciety from harm. The U.S. Supreme Court's similar sentiment in East River
provides the cornerstone of the economic loss rule.'
The second reason supporting adopton of the economic loss rule is that
it ensures each party has the "freedom to contract."'7 2 In theory, parties
engaged in commercial activities have similar or equal bargaining power al-
lowing them to allocate risks through disclaimers and warranties.'73 Never-
theless, "[iif manufacturers are held liable to remote commercial purchasers
under tort theories for frustrated economic expectations, all manufacturers
would effectively be prevented from negotiating their liability through the
bargaining process."' 74 Commercial buyers can also purchase goods for a
lower cost when there is no warranty, meaning that they have bargained
for a less expensive good at the risk of the product not living up to their
expectations.' Accordingly, allowing a consumer to sue under tort law for
economic damages would give the plaintiff an unfair benefit and defeat the
purpose of warranties in general.'76 Without the economic loss rule, tort law
would supersede bargained-for contracts, and "contract law would drown in
a sea of tort."' 77
In addition to maintaining the line courts have drawn between contract
and tort, the economic loss rule also encourages parties to allocate their
risks in the contract instead of relying on tort law. 70 This looks to the con-
tracting parties and their ability to adjust price according to their respec-
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986).
172 Cdarapids, 573 N.W.2d at 847.
173 Id. at 848.
174 Id.
'75
Courts should assume that parties factor risk allocation into their
agreements and that the absence of comprehensive warranties is reflect-
ed in the price paid. Permitting parties to sue in tort when the deal goes
awry rewrites the agreement by allowing a party to recoup a benefit that
was not part of the bargain.
Stoughton Trailers Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F Supp. 1227, 1230 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
176 Id.
177 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
178 Ctdarapids, S73 N.W.2d at 849.
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tive liabilities 179 This allows manufacturers and retailers to plan reasonably
for future costs and liabilities. 180 Otherwise, tort liability creates the pos-
sibility of unforeseen risks and liabilities since later purchasers could have
different expectations for the product.'8' Accordingly, manufacturers would
suffer an injustice or, at the very least, have difficulty insuring themselves
against these losses.'
To reinforce these reasons, other state and federal courts, have turned
to the Uniform Commercial Code. The Michigan Supreme Court held that
"where a plaintiff seeks to recover for economic loss caused by a defec-
tive product purchased for commercial purposes, the exclusive remedy is
provided by the UCC ... ."83 Courts have also suggested that plaintiffs
look to their warranties, both implied and express, when the contract does
not provide a sufficient remedy.'84 These implied warranties allow parties
to get the proverbial "benefit of the bargain" when the product does not
live up to their expectations. 8 - Plaintiffs can only recover, however, if they
can prove that they had a reasonable expectation to believe the product
would perform in a certain way (e.g., they reasonably relied on an adver-
tisement). 86 This puts the risk on the manufacturer or distributor but with
reasonable limitations not found in tort law.
Viewing economic loss from an economic perspective, Judge Posner
has also delineated three slightly different reasons for the application of
the economic loss rule.'87 The first defines lost profits, like those typically
found in economic loss cases, as "a 'private' rather than a 'social' cost,"'"
meaning that the losses do not pass on to the rest of society."9 The second
reason stems from the fact that the tortfeasor could never properly insure
179 Id. ("Commercial enterprises allocate the risk of loss due to nonperformance among
themselves and pass this cost on to the other purchasers by way of higher prices.").
18o Id. (The court noted that adjusting liability through price allows "commercial risks
and problems generally" to "be solved with predictable consequences.").
I81 Id.; see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d i45, 150-51 (Cal. 1965).
i82 Cedarapids, 573 N.W.2d at 849.
183 Neibarger v. Universal Coop., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 61z, 618 (Mich. 1992).
I84 Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 E3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 1994) (Applying
Michigan law, the Sixth Circuit stated, "[wihen a product does not live up to the require-
ments of the sales contract, the UCC enables a purchaser to recover on the basis of implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability, as well as on any express warranties created between
the parties." (citation omitted)).
I85 Id. (citing Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 615).
i86 See U.C.C. § 2-314, 2-315 (1998).
187 Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 736-4o (2006) (exploring the economic rationales behind the economic loss
rule).
188 Id. at 736-37.
i89 Id. at 737 ("A social cost is a diminution in the total value of society's economic goods;
a private cost is a loss to one person that produces an equal gain to another. In other words,
private costs result in a transfer of wealth but not a diminution of it.").
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against lost profits, since it would be difficult, if not impossible to predict
the losses.'"' The third reason notes the difficulty in establishing bound-
aries and limits for victims who suffer economic damages, as opposed to
those who suffer physical ones.19' While physical injuries are easily deter-
mined, the extent of the economic damages for which a defendant should
be liable is much harder to assess. 9 Even from an economic viewpoint,
the economic loss rule helps society as a whole by preventing parties from
facing damages that they cannot predict or insure against.
The adoption of the economic loss rule by the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability'93 not only illustrates the growing influence of the
rule but also presents another reason for its adoption. The economic loss
rule falls under section 21, which states in part that "harm to persons or
property includes economic loss if caused by harm to ... the plaintiff's
property other than the defective product itself."' 94 This rule follows the
classic economic loss rule language which forbids damages under a tort
claim in cases where the only losses sustained were damage to the product
itself.195 The American Law Institute provided two reasons for adopting
this rule, which emphasized the need to keep contract and tort law dis-
tinct. 96 The Restatement provides even more support for Kentucky's adop-
I9o Id. at 737-38. On the one hand, "insurance can be purchased [by the tortfeasorl only
if the insurance company can calculate the risk of loss, since without such a calculation there
is no way to fix a premium." Id. at 738. On the other hand,
each [plaintiff] business that might be affected by such an accident
knows the value of its inventory and of its fixed assets, knows its cus-
tomers' behaviors, the pattern of demands, staff expense, and so forth,
and can use that information either to take precautions (the commercial
equivalent of fastening one's seatbelt) that will minimize any business
losses from an accident, or to buy insurance. For an insurance company
should be able to calculate the risk of business loss from all accidents.:
Id.
i9i Id. at 739 ("The third economic reason for the economic-loss doctrine is that the
determination of damages is more difficult when there is no physical connection to the injury
because it is much harder to delimit the victims.").
192 Id. As Posner explains in his hypothetical, damages to the sidewalk in front of a store
could extend beyond the store itself and include other nearby businesses as well as the cus-
tomers inconvenienced by the accident. Once the proper parties are identified, the extent of
the damages for which the defendant would be liable would still have to be determined.
193 RESTATEMENT (TI RD) OF TORTS: PROD. LiAB. § 21 (1998). This section is titled
"Definition Of 'Harm to Person or Property': Recovery For Economic Loss."
194 Id.
195 See RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d (1998) (compiling cases
that adopted the "product itself" position).
196 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (1998) ("First, products li-
ability law lies at the boundary between tort and contract .... Second, some forms of economic
loss have traditionally been excluded from the realm of tort law even when the plaintiff has no
contractual remedy for a claim.").
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tion of the economic loss rule because it shows the general acceptance of
the rule and emphasizes the important role the rule has in separating tort
and contract law.
Aside from maintaining the distinction between contract and tort law,
the reasons for adopting the economic loss rule are numerous and dem-
onstrate that this policy would benefit parties to this type of litigation in
Kentucky. Parties have the ability to allocate their risks within the contract,
and the economic loss rule encourages this practice. 197 In fact, contracting
parties often establish prices based on the liabilities they are willing to
accept.198 To allow parties to sue in tort when unexpected circumstances
affecting performance arise would essentially nullify the contract and open
defendants to liability they did not expect, could not foresee, and could not
insure against. 99 Furthermore, the Uniform Commercial Code has pro-
vided potential plaintiffs with reasonable protections."° Kentucky needs
to adopt the economic loss rule and apply it even to certain areas beyond
products liability to protect future defendants from the otherwise unrea-
sonable liability. Finally, Kentucky should follow the lead of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which has already adopted the economic
loss rule, showing the rule's prominence across the nation.
B. Exceptions to the Economic Loss Rule
Various judicially created exceptions poke holes through the otherwise
worthy shield of the economic loss rule. Negligent misrepresentation
stands as one of the biggest exceptions to the economic loss rule. 0' Fraud,
an alternative to suing for negligent misrepresentation, has also arisen as a
prominent exception. 02 The courts have carved out an exception for ser-
vice contracts as well. °3 While other exceptions exist, the three discussed
below represent the key exceptions recognized in most jurisdictions2z°4
Negligent misrepresentation presents one of the broadest exceptions to
the economic loss rule. As discussed in Presnell,05 negligent misrepresenta-
tion comes from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552.06 The courts have
applied negligent misrepresentation in a number of fashions. 07 The basic
197 See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes i 78-82 and accompanying text.
i99 See supra notes 178-82, 187-92 and accompanying text.
2oo See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 205-1i and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
204 See e.g., Edelstein, supra note 24.
205 Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., LLC, 134 S-W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2004),
2o6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
207 See Edelstein, supra note 24, at 46 (listing four approaches: a blanket exception, an
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principle, however, extends the exception to cases where the defendant's
improper misrepresentation of facts resulted in the plaintiff's economic
losses. 0 8 While some argue that the negligent misrepresentation excep-
tion is necessary to protect parties from fraudulent claims,2 °9 the parties still
have the freedom to place penalties for fraud in their contracts. °10 Contracts
containing penalty clauses for delays of service or ineffective products pro-
vide the buyer with sufficient protection from misrepresentation." The
economic loss rule does not need the negligent misrepresentation excep-
tion because parties can allocate that risk in their contracts, a goal of the
economic loss rule.
2 12
Courts have also found that fraud provides an exception to the eco-
nomic loss rule and have listed several reasons why this exception should
exist.2 13 Proponents of this exception essentially argue that fraud is based
exception "limited to defendants in the business of supplying information for the guidance of
others," disallowing claims for negligent misrepresentation when privity exists between the
parties, and finally permitting no exception for negligent misrepresentation).
2o8 See id.; see also Henderson, supra note Joi, at 183 (arguing that "section 552 creates
a duty, arising independently from any contractual obligations, upon design professionals to
exercise reasonable care in supplying information for the guidance of other participants in the
Constr. process").
209 See Edelstein, supra note 24, at 46.
2 10 See Matthew S. Steffey, Negligence, Contract, and Architects' Liability for Economic Loss,
82 Ky. L.J. 659, 683 (1994). But see Henderson, supra note io1, at 155 ("[Sitandard form con-
tracts are widely used in the [construction] industry and their provisions typically favor design
professionals. Thus, a conclusion that a contractor has the ability to freely bargain for available
remedies may be a bit misleading.").
211 See generally Steffey, supra note 21 o, at 681-701.
212 See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.zd 842, 846 (Wis. 1998); see
also Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 44I, 444 (N.Y. 1931). Chief Judge Cardozo estab-
lished that a defendant was not liable to a third party for misrepresentations to an employer
on which the third party reasonably relied. The court stated,
The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to
make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract
to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. Fraud in-
cludes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none. To
creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate,
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there
was notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not
intend to keep it to himself. A different question develops when we ask
whether they owed a duty to these to make it without negligence. If
liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an in-
determinate time to an indeterminate class.
Id. (citations omitted).
2 13 Edelstein, supra note 24, at 45-46. Butsee Posner, supra note 187, at 745-47 (offering




in tort and is therefore separate and distinct from contract.1 4 The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court has also accepted this line of reasoning, stating that
"[t]he idea that any person or industry or enterprise would be immune
from liability for fraud and deceit is not acceptable." 15 The basis for this
statement, however, came from a 1956 opinion by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, which found it against public policy to allow a contracting party
to escape liability for fraud .1 6 When the court first issued this statement
against fraud, the Uniform Commercial Code and its full set of commercial
remedies had not yet developed, and so commercial parties needed this
type of protection."1 7 Now, parties can sue to obtain the benefit of the bar-
gain with other contractual protections in place."1 8 Nevertheless, the puni-
tive aspect of allowing parties to sue for fraud when economic losses occur
does present a strong policy reason for allowing the exception, which would
deter fraud.
Service contracts represent the third major judicially created exception
to the economic loss rule, following the traditional line of thinking that the
economic loss rule should apply only to products liability and should not
apply to cases involving the performance of a service." 9 This argument,
however, fails to recognize the reasons behind adopting the rule. The free-
dom of parties to allocate their risks in a contract can also apply to a service
contract.2 0 Nevertheless, such an exception could have a valid place in
the world of professional contracts, where the parties have a higher duty
of care. 2 ' Subjecting professionals such as lawyers and accountants to tort
liability could deter future harm because of the personal liability at stake.22
214 Edelstein, supra note 24, at 46.
215 Hanson v.Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 865 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Ky. 1993).
216
The law should not, and does not permit a covenant of immunity
to be drawn that will protect a person against his own fraud. Such is not
enforceable because of public policy. Language is not strong enough to
write such a contract. Fraud destroys all consent. It is the purpose of the
law to shield only those whose armor embraces good faith.
Id. at 309-10 (citing Bryant v. Troutman, 287 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Ky. 1956)).
2 17 See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
2 18 See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text. But see Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass,
New Rules for Promissory Fraud, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 957, 962 (2006); Jean Braucher, Deception,
Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority
in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 829, 832-33 (2oo6); Dobbs, supra note I6I, at
728-30 (arguing against expansions of the economic loss rule that would forbid punitive dam-
ages when the defendant knowingly committed fraud).
219 See Edelstein, supra note 24, at 43-44.
220 See Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 452 E Supp. 2d I 167, 1173-74 (D.N.M.
2oo6).
221 See id. at 1174; see also Edelstein, supra note 24, at 44.
222 See Edelstein, supra note 24, at 44.
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Once again, contractual remedies seem sufficient when no higher duty of
care is present, requiring no need for this exception to the economic loss
rule.
C. The "Intermediate" Approach to the Economic Loss Rule
A third approach to the economic loss rule draws a line between the ma-
jority position in Seely"23 and the minority view in Santor 4 and examines
whether the defective product had the potential to do physical harm . 2 As
the Court stated, the post-Santor and post-Seely "cases attempt to differen-
tiate between 'the disappointed users ... and the endangered ones,' and
permit only the latter to sue in tort. '22 6 The East River Court found these
approaches to be "too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to
structure their business behavior," ' 7 which is a basic tenet of the economic
loss rule. Although this segregated approach adopts the economic loss rule
in theory, it would prove difficult to apply because plaintiffs would cer-
tainly argue that their defective products had potential to inflict damage."2 '
Furthermore, it would wind up as another exception to the economic loss
rule because, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted, it would hinder the ability
of the parties to allocate risks in the contract.
22 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Returning to the taxi company at the beginning of this Note, the need for
the economic loss rule becomes clear. When selling the taxis, the retailer
had no way of insuring against the lost profits that the taxi company might
incur if the taxis did not perform properly. Furthermore, a rival cab compa-
ny will reap the profits lost by the taxi company, and the impact on society
will be minimal. 30 Applying the economic loss rule forces the taxi company
either to insure itself against such disasters or to pay a higher price for the
product and receive a contract with penalty provisions protecting their in-
terests. The economic loss rule forces contracting parties to allocate their
risks in a fashion that provides greater security for both and a lower cost for
the consumer.
While the economic loss rule does not have a long history in United
States jurisprudence, it has developed into a formidable tool for contract-
223 See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 44-5o and accompanying text.
225 See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1986).
226 Id. (quoting Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.zd 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978)).
227 E. River, 476 U.S. at 870.
228 Id.
229 See id.
230 See Posner, supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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ing parties. Since its inception, courts have used it to separate the spheres
of tort and contract to ensure that parties would avoid liability for dam-
ages not bargained for in their contracts. In utilizing the economic loss rule,
courts have furthered several sound legal policies. When courts encourage
parties to allocate their risks in a contract, it helps decrease costs because
the manufacturer or service provider can adequately insure itself against
future liability. While allowing certain exceptions might discourage parties
from fraudulent conduct, most exceptions needlessly hinder the economic
loss rule. With the adoption of negligent misrepresentation in Presnell, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has already provided a significant exception to
the economic loss rule-before the court had even adopted it. Neverthe-
less, the Kentucky Supreme Court should expressly adopt the economic
loss rule, without exception, so that parties contracting in the common-
wealth are forced to allocate their risks in their contracts, which will pro-
vide greater certainty of their liabilities and lower prices for consumers.

